I read the recent SIA in-house licensing review with a mixture of despair and disappointment, writes Wilson Chowdhry, of SIA approved contactor AA Security.
The SIA have determined post-consultation with industry representatives, that their was "no substantiated risk to public protection" and hence recommended the status quo be maintained in respect to the existing licensing exemption to in-house security teams. The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions allegedly discussed the matter with the SIA Chair and the Chief Executive "in detail" and approved the recommendation "requesting that the subject be revisited in three years".
The SIA decision was purportedly based on the provisions within the "legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 (LARAA) and the "Regulators Compliance Code" (RCC). In extrapolating a focus for the study of potential in-house security industry licensing the SIA seem to have completely overlooked the purported "Vision" displayed on their website:
"Our vision is to work with others to create a safer environment for the public and better opportunities for the Private Security Industry."
If the SIA’s vision is for better opportunities for our industry why has the entirety of this research focused on public safety? What about fairness, accountability and traceability that would all arise from uniform practices or for want of better words a level playing field? The opening line from the quoted RCC’s "Purpose of the code", section 1.1 asserts:
"effective and well targeted regulation is essential in promoting FAIRNESS and protection from harm"
The fairness agenda seems to have completely been overlooked? The SIA might latch on to section 2.6 of the code:
"The regulator is not bound to follow a provision of the code if they properly conclude that the provision is either not relevant or is outweighed by another relevant decision"
The SIA have failed to explain why they have concluded fairness is not a relevant criteria within their assessment – Even though they quote the "majority" (no indication of percentage?) of the industry believe this to be a primary reason for regulation of in-house practitioners.
In particular, I find the SIA decision preposterous as throughout the review paper, frequent reference is made about stakeholders being unable to provide any palpable evidence of malpractice or lethargy within in-house training or recruitment practice…? This very questionable response from the SIA seems rather naïve. Surely as industry regulators the onus is on regulators and not stakeholders to source such evidence? The RCC section 1.4 clearly states:
"The code supports regulators’ responsibility to deliver desirable regulatory outcomes."
Besides with very few reports within the industry of organisations with in-house teams converting to contract security – how is it feasible for contractors bereft of opportunity to gauge in-house performance to provide any substantial evidence?
Surely, more useful data could have been extrapolated from the Irish and French Security licensing schemes – these schemes are alluded to within the in-house paper, however their usefulness seems rather intentionally quashed by the SIA as they argued the schemes differed in their licensing of in-house security and contract companies themselves. Their conclusion that such practices caused conflict with our existing legislation is correct, however, that would not subtract from the value of the evidence these organisation would have regarding the real impact of licensing their relative in-house sectors? For in-house sectors both schemes require only the licensing of individuals – this could be a workable scheme in the UK. The SIA stance however is:
"….it has no direct relevance for us. UK Legislation is constructed on the presumption that the contract supply only is licensable, with the ability to make some circumstances (through additional controls) subject to in-house licensing where there is additional risk or concern, UK definitions of licensable activity follow this assumption and may not fit another type of regime."
Legislative conflict would not reduce the worth of the potential data concerning the effect of licensing of in-house security operations? There is no Catch 22 just a display of "jobsworth" or officious mentality from the SIA. The foreign data could have been used to calibrate the potential public risk of continuing with our existing SIA structure and could have impacted significantly on the overall "vision" of this in-house review. The SIA encourages ACS membership organisations to create wider networks within and external to our industry. Perhaps they should read their own manual? Moreover, section 4.2 of RCC maintains:
"Risk assessment should be based on all available relevant and good quality data…"
Section 24 6(b) of LRRA also allows consultation with organisations deemed suitable. Furthermore there is a stipulation within the RCC section 7.1 – for organisations to undertake analysis of the benefit of data requests with explicit consideration to "other sources"!
Case study
Recently our associated training academy provided mandatory 4 day learning to security officers deployed by a local authority in-house security team. The council decided to embark on a SIA training and licensing programme, pre-empting an alteration to existing legislation that would finally see the introduction of wider licensing implications encompassing our privileged in-house cronies.
During learning provision the council’s security officers and management team exhibited fears of examination failure and non-cognisance. Similar behaviour and feelings of anxiety felt by the contract security industry in the nascent phase of our licensing remit.
Suffice to say, we had a pass rate within our organisation commensurate with the
Council’s security Officers (a 100 per cent pass rate including a 12pc reassessment slippage), presenting a parity status between both organisations recruits . However, post-course evaluations surveys and regular formal and summative assessments indicated learners benefitted immensely from the course. All learners confirmed attainment of new and beneficial knowledge of their job role and expressed they felt more competent and assured resulting in increased morale.
I submit this example, as evidently there was a derived benefit for working towards the SIA licensing remit – with tangible evidence. Had I undertaken this training exercise prior to the SIA’s Questionnaire on in-house security I would surely have shared this information. However, data protection in particular client confidentiality limits the capability of hard data? I am reticent to reveal the identity of this organisation in this article for this very reason. More to the point, how can I or the SIA assess the risk to public safety from the lack of such obvious training, when the council in question has been providing a security service for an extremely long time without any major public incident? Perhaps, it is not so much the incidents that provide the palpable evidence of risk to public safety and our focus should be on the uniformity or training and criminality checks that is a direct result of the SIA licensing remit. The assumption that in-house security training provision is more specific a common feature of the SIA i-house review is ludicrous. I would encourage the SIA review our working practices and training regime which has in part led to our significantly high score of +92 within our most recent SIA ACS review! The local authority used in our case study have terminated their focus on SIA training and licensing as a result of the in-house review. This decision was based on the fiscal burden of the licensing process – how fortunate they have this loophole!
Section 14 of the RCC emphasizes:
"Regulators should consider the impact that their regulatory interventions may have on economic progress, including thorough consideration of the costs, effectiveness and
perceptions of fairness of regulation."
It is evident that the primary main benefits of SIA licensing is that the public are
guaranteed that licensed officers are trained, vetted and cleared to work . Within the in-house paper the SIA chose to reflect on evidence that criminality checks in the in-house world generally occur subsequent to, rather than pre-employment. Moreover the SIA also alludes that criminality checks may be sought every two or three years and generally most retail in-house security providers "claim" that 3 years is their norm hmm! Moreover, of ten universities only three out of 10 delegates review criminality checks every three years and they are working with an extremely vulnerable group.
SIA licensed contractors have the opportunity to check daily on the validity of licenses – which can be revoked after a criminal incident. Furthermore, as in the above case study, the SIA admit that training provision varies between in-house companies. How can the SIA justify a decision to nullify the risk to public of these potential deviances in criminality and training records and their impact on potential public safety, by referring to an assumption that most of the public cannot tell the difference between a licensed and unlicensed officer? Surely, this is the very reason why we need to enhance the licensing remit to reduce the potential abuses this abject faith for people in uniform could induce? The SIA state:
"…more often than not, members of the public don’t see the difference between in-house and contract guards even when in different uniforms: as long as the guard is in uniform the public places trust in the paper."
Please make your own decision on whether such comments justify the SIA recommendation to continue with exemption for the in-house security industry…?
The paper also highlights the fact that universities believe the licensing of their security officers will create a fiscal burden that might result in the loss of some employment. To me this sounds like balderdash and piffle! Our industry survived the economic pressures of licensing and I am sure the in-house industry would too. If the same respondents were honest, they would probably state that the fear of losing their employees to the private sector would be a more immediate danger. Although in many cases the in-house security sector is reported to pay higher salaries – I am aware that this is not always the case. As an organisation we are proud of our low staff turnover rate that is based on exemplary employee support programmes and better than average pay rates.
Many in-house security teams would see the large fluctuating staffing levels of others in the industry should a requirement of licensing ensue. This would result in increased
recruitment costs and the logistical nightmare of rostering under pressure. Such reaction would in my assumption, be felt more in the retail industry then other in-house regimes using my 15 year experience as a security director. However, employees leave employment for a number of reasons including stress, need for change, relocating homes and promotion to name a few. A license would provide employees with a passport to entry into the wider security sector.
One of the on-line published SIA objectives is:
"to build on our credibility with stakeholders."
A paper review and biased decision based on incomplete research and subjective
analysis, undermines much of the work the SIA has done. Perhaps one way forward is for the SIA to create some forums between organisations from the in-house
and private security arenas. Here I feel it is necessary to quote section 4.4 of the RCC:
"Regulators should consult and involve regulated entities and other interested parties in designing their risk methodologies…"
Such groups could be used to share best practice, create better intelligence of industry
needs and calibrate the performance of the two different regimes. Any change towards the licensing of in-house security evoked as a consequence of these forums could be monitored by using the group as a scrutiny panel for decisions including how far the remit should encompass managers of in-house teams and what constitutes an in-house licensable activity rather than relying on 48 responses to an ill-fated survey that was too complicated and involved – creating what I term a "response reticence" from busy managers within our industry – I was one of the 48 that patiently persevered!
Our industry will have to continue to support and assist the SIA who remain only
organisation with the position leverage to manifest palpable change to our industry –
much of their work has complimented our industry and they have been relatively open to our opinions resulting in improved services.
Section 4.5 of the RCC demands that regulatory organisations use feedback from
regulated entities and other interested parties to improve their risk assessment process. I hope my comments in this article are taken on board and help in then conducting a more favourable review of in-house licensing in future. I also draw their attention to the fact that both the RCC and LRRA have little or no legislative or regulatory impact in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. This could permit more flexibility in their reviews of and potential introduction of pilot in-house licensing schemes in these regions…?
Evidence suggests the majority of private sector organisations favour the fairness that would be induced from a wider fully encompassing SIA Licensing remit, that adequately absorbs all primarily security related operations. In three years there will be another window of opportunity to amend this flaw in the existing legislation. Perhaps working in partnership we can finally bring some parity to a rather biased scheme…?
