In the January 2016 print edition of Professional Security Magazine, an article discussed how risk associated with unattended bags is managed. This contribution to that debate gives some background to the development of British Transport Police’s H-O-T protocol – and emphasises the importance of context when operating under conditions of uncertainty, writes Dr Adrian Dwyer OBE, Counter-Terrorism Risk Adviser, British Transport Police.
Unattended items and the perception of risk
In a little under 36 months between 1991 and 1994, Britain’s railway network was targeted on more than 36 occasions by the Provisional IRA. The weapon of choice was the hand-placed, timer-controlled improvised explosive device (IED). In the minds of rail users, any unattended item could contain a bomb, and this represented a significant problem because, each day, hundreds of items were lost or abandoned on trains and in stations. For a brief period in 1992, for example, this meant one incident in every seven closed a station. Similar reactions were noted in other public spaces. It was recognised that something had to be done – and treating every item of lost property, or carelessly discarded rubbish, as if it were a confirmed IED was neither tenable nor proportionate.
To address this challenge, British Transport Police (BTP) examined a sample of several thousand incidents. The findings were striking but perhaps not unexpected. Forgetful passengers left items where they had been waiting, often in clear public view. Terrorists, on the other hand, sought to ensure the objects they emplaced were typically:
•not left where they might be observed (where there was the possibility of someone trying to hand the bag back);
•not left where the IED was likely to be moved (either by a helpful member of the public or, as was noted elsewhere, by a thief);
•located where deliberate discovery was unlikely (ie, an attempt to defeat security ‘sweeps’).
Distinguishing signal from noise
Using this knowledge, a protocol was devised to provide a focus for rail staff and a consistent procedure for their interactions with police. The H-O-T protocol provided a basis for decision-making and carefully blended knowledge of the rail environment with a range of specific counter-terrorism activities. It was supported by bespoke training, briefed to all railway staff (a task now regulated by the Department for Transport) and used as the basis for the police response. Through the relatively simple approach of asking the original finder to consider the answer to three questions, the ratio of station closures quickly fell from one in seven, to one in several hundred. The questions are simple but, in context, the answers can be telling.
•Is the object HIDDEN?
Deliberate concealment is considered more significant than if an object is discovered at the foot of a ticket machine in the middle of a busy concourse, for example.
•Is the object OBVIOUSLY suspicious?
A question that relates directly to the specific training given to all staff and the regular briefings they receive.
•Is the object TYPICAL of the environment in which it was found.
A forgotten bag on a train seat is not an unusual occurrence. However, the same object placed within a false ceiling or in a lavatory cistern suggests deliberate intent to conceal (a factor that may indicate the need for immediate involvement by police). Equally importantly, the process of evaluation ensured objects with genuinely suspicious characteristics were identified more quickly – that the ‘signal’ of suspicion was more readily distinguishable from the background ‘noise’ of benign lost property. Typically, in excess of 250,000 unattended items are dealt with by rail staff each year.
When a BTP officer found a bag concealed in a litter bin outside Oxford Circus tube station in August 1994, he noted it weighed at least 2kg more than he was expecting and contained electrical components. The risk management response was emphatic, unambiguous, and successful. Public safety was maintained and significant forensic evidence recovered. Today, the H-O-T protocol is promoted in a range of environments beyond mass transit rail. This is not to suggest that the H-O-T protocol will, in isolation, address all situations and will always result in the outcome attained at Oxford Circus – it is not a panacea. However, what it continues to demonstrate is that by considering the three questions in context, it represents a rational and proportionate response to risk under conditions of uncertainty.
More reading
The HOT protocol was featured as part of an article on BTP’s use of Project Servator; deployments are unpredictable and highly visible. They are designed to deter, detect and disrupt a range of crime: see more at http://www.btp.police.uk.
Picture by Mark Rowe; London Kings Cross, morning.
