Training

Going for gold?

by Mark Rowe

Luke Houlden, pictured, looks at the use to businesses of the UK Home Office ‘Gold Silver Bronze’ (GSB) system for dealing with disasters.

Luke Houlden looks at the use to businesses of the UK Home Office ‘Gold Silver Bronze’ (GSB) system for dealing with disasters.

What is the relevance of the UK Home Office ‘Gold, Silver and Bronze’ (GSB) structure for the business continuity of businesses in disasters? Critical examination of the evidence indicates that the UK Home Office GSB structure has some similar practices to commercial organisation but it is ill suited for commerce. Commercial organisations have been shown to be better suited at responding to disasters as a whole organisation rather than restructuring the organisation to do so. Rather, there is a requirement for commercial organisations to adopt business continuity as a method of avoiding disasters, which in turn will diminish the requirement for them to be responded to and managed.

The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and The National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) (2009a, p. 6) state that on certain occasions normal operational structures may not be effective at managing an event therefore a dedicated ‘command and control’ structure should be implemented in order to deal with the event. This ‘command and control’ would normally take the form of GSB (ACPO, NPIA, 2009, p. 12-15). Borodzicz (2004, p. 415) states that crisis situations over recent decades have at times called into question the role of response organisations. This implies that GSB is not an effective structure for business continuity and would therefore have little or no use to a commercial organisation. In order to evaluate that possibility this essays will examine the usefulness of the GSB ‘command and control’ structure by firstly discussing what is meant by disaster and business continuity management before discussing the UK Home Offices GSB command structure then finally assessing the best possible method for an organisation to deal with a disaster.

A disaster has been defined by Borodzicz (2005, p. 25) as an ill structured crisis scenario, which may in turn have resulted from a poorly handled crisis (Brorodzicz, 2005, p. 82). Borodzicz (2005, p. 25) describes a crisis as differing from an emergency, a situation that requires the quick application of a set of policies or procedures, in that a crisis is normally fast moving and lacks information. This fluid situation and lack of information makes a standardised response appear almost impossible. It seems clear that the ability and effectiveness of an organisations response to a crisis may directly affect whether or not that organisation has to deal with a disaster. Logically, the best action for an organisation to take might be to avoid as many crisis’s as possible which would imply that business continuity management is best suited to preventing disasters. Brorodzicz (2004, p. 414) asserts that a disaster is no longer seen as a tragic natural event but rather as a failure of some form of management system. This implies that all disasters are in fact avoidable and therefore the requirement to manage one should be muted by effective business continuity management.

In order to avoid a crisis situation, or to deal with the effects of one, an organisation may employee a business continuity management plan (Borodzicz, 2005, p. 58-87; Drewitt, 2012, p, 14-17; Engemann & Henderson, 2012, p. 4-7). Business continuity has been defined by the Business Continuity Institute (2012) as a ‘holistic’ approach to identify threats and implement plans to ensure the business is able to overcome those threats. Business continuity could be seen as not only an organisations ability to overcome events but also its ability to avoid them by promoting good business techniques. Singh (2008, p. 177) states that businesses should aim to integrate their business continuity planning with the day to day running of their business which will create a resilient organisational culture. Singh (2008, p. 175) asserts that business continuity plans that are merely gestures and are not integrated into an organisations culture will fail. This in turn implies that disaster management and recovery should be seen as a business management issue rather than a mirror of the emergency services GSB response.

ACPO and NPIA (2009b, p. 19) assert that business continuity should not form part of the GSB ‘command and control’ structure. The acknowledgement by ACPO and NIPA (2009b p. 19) that business continuity should be included in the ‘command and control’ structure is perhaps indicative of its effectiveness when dealing with disasters. Emerald Insight Staff (2004, p. 218 & p. 223) state that disaster management should be seen in a ‘holistic’ way and tackled by the entire organisation which in turn will create new initiatives and allow the organisation to share the responsibility for disaster planning and recovery. Disaster management could subsequently be seen as a business continuity issue rather than an emergency services ‘command and control’ problem. Indicating therefore that the GSB command structure would be ill suited to a commercial organisation.

The Cabinet Office (2004, p. 26) assert that The UK Home Office’s GSB command structure, used by the UK emergency services, could be useful when dealing with any crisis type situation. However, the Cabinet Office (2004, p. 26) and The UK Home Office (2013, p. 50) suggest that these labels should be changed to ‘strategic tactical and operational’ as apposed GSB which the Cabinet Office (2004, p. 26) argues creates confusion about their function to people who are unfamiliar with these labels. This seems to suggest that the GSB command structure does indeed have a use for the emergency services but causes confusion when implemented in this way. As Underwood (2010, p. 18) argues one of the main problems when dealing with any disaster seems to be communication, then it would appear to make sense to continue to use the normal organisation structure and not attempt to change it, thus potentially increasing the understanding of roles within an organisations business continuity plan and therefore the plans effectiveness.

Bordodzicz (2005, p. 101) asserts that the GSB command and control structure is not suited to ill structured crisis situation such as disasters. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that any similar ‘militaristic’ style ‘command and control’ structure would not be suitable for a commercial organisation to use in a disaster response situation. Elliot et al (2001, p. 57) and Elliot (2006, p. 546) identifies that no two businesses are alike, not even those operating in the same sector. This seems to suggest every organisation is complex in its own unique way and therefore requires different structures and operating practices. Elliot (2006, p. 546) goes onto suggest that the three tiered approach should be a minimum response. Consequently, perhaps the logical thing for each business to do is to set up its own response structure and method foregoing the one that has been created by the UK Home Office.

Howe (2010, p. 149) suggests that organisations could respond to disasters as a whole or could divert the responsibility of responding disasters to a section of the business that has the required skill set to deal with that particular disaster. This in turn may lead to the organisation not being able to bring to bear its entire resource when dealing with a disaster which may prove to be ineffective. Boin et al (2010, p. 357) and Borodzicz (2005, p. 102) stipulate that the emergency service GSB framework does not work very well in a disaster situation as there tends to be either the wrong, too much or too few information available for any two organisation to work together effectively.

Quarantelli (1988, p. 375) identifies communication as the main barrier to dealing with a disaster. Robinson and Smallman (2012, p. 122) assert that business can be empowered by its adoption of technology and that technology could allow business to become more flexible. Adopting technology has been highlighted by ACPO and NPIA (2009a, p. 21-22) as essential for the commanders in the GSB structure to make effective decisions. This element of communication seems to have uses for both disaster management as well as the day to day running of organisations. As Bordodzicz (2005, p. 101) points out that disasters are, by their very nature, ill structured and fluid. Therefore it may be reasonable to assert that rather than adopting rigid structures, such as GSB, commercial organisations should look to incorporate technologies into their normal organisational structure that enable them to respond to a disaster with the right people in a more fluid manner.

Wachtendorf (2004, p. 114) describes the ability of organisations to work together in a crisis disaster as vital. Wachtendorf (2004, p. 123) refers to this phenomena as “emergent multi-organisation networks (EMON)”. This seems to highlight the importance of information sharing both inside the organisation and externally. Elliot (2006, p. 534) asserts that the UK Home Office GSB approach to command and control is too autocratic to allow for a speedy flow of information. Perhaps what is required is a more free moving formation, one with the ability to adapt and overcome the challenges that are unique to disasters. This view that GSB is ineffective during a disaster situation is shared by Miles (2012, p. 14) and HM Government (2013, p. 53) who state that GSB should be clearly distinguished from multi agency groups. It seems clear that commercial organisation then need to move away from the idea that GSB is the ‘fait accompli’ of disaster management and start thinking innovatively both in the planning stage and as during the disaster.

Wachtendorf (2004, p. 116) emphasises that commercial organisation are in a continual state of flux, constantly changing to their environment both physically and commercially. It seems logical to suggest that organisations are in fact already in the best possible position to deal with a disaster. Cavanagh (2005, p. 49) states that the value of spending on security, including business continuity, will only become apparent when the board see it as a proactive management tool and not just a reactive force. Ultimately the only value that a corporate security manager can offer to a commercial organisation is to ensure that they are exposed to as few crisis events as possible by ensuring that the organisation as a whole uses and implements good business practices.

Briggs and Edwards (2006, p. 54) argue that security and business continuity should function within the normal matrix structure of a business. This can be achieved by ensuring good communication up, down, and across the business as well as building effective relationships with other organisations and having a working knowledge of change management (Briggs & Edwards, 2006, p. 54). Comfort (2005, p. 347) and Singh (2008, p. 176) argue that good business continuity involves communicating with partner organisations and offering help and reassurance. Another way of saying this may be that business continuity should take into account the requirements of the organisations stakeholders.

Briggs and Edwards (2006, p. 89) assert that good crisis and disaster management is the result of having the right people in the right role with the right level of training. This insinuates that an organisations ability to recover from a disaster does not solely depend on its structure but rather on the people employed within it. This view is supported by ACPO and NPIA (2009a, p. 11) who assert that it is essential to select and train the correct people for the right roles. Training a personal selection then are central to the effectiveness of both business continuity and the GSB system. This similarity identifies the importance of personnel and their business knowledge, something that might be learnt from the GSB system.

References
Association of Chief Police Officers, National Police Improvement Agency. (2009a). Guidance on Command and Control. Bedfordshire: Special Operations Centre.
Association of Chief Police Officers, National Police Improvement Agency. (2009b). Guidance on Emergency Procedures. Bedfordshire: Special Operations Centre.
Boin, A., & Hart, P. (2010). Organising for Effective Emergency Management: Lessons from Research. The Australian Journal of Public Administration, 69 (4), 357-371.
Borodzicz, E. (2004). The missing ingredient is the value of flexibility. Simulation and Gaming, 35, 414-426.
Borodzicz, E. (2005). Risk, Crisis and Security Management. West Sussex: Wiley.
Briggs, R. & Edwards, C. (2006). The Business of Resilience: Corportate Security for the 21st Century. London: Demos.
Business Continuity Institute. (2012). What is BC?. Retrieved from internet site:
Cavanagh, T. (2005). Corporate Security Measures and Practices: An Overview of Security Management Since 9/11. (05-01-SR). USA: Conference Board.
Comfort, L. (2005). Risk, Security, and Disaster Management. Annual Review of Political Science, 8. 335 356.
Drewitt, T. (2012). Everything you want to know about Business Continuity. Cambridge: IT Governance Publishing.
Elliot, D. (2006). Disaster and Crisis Management. Gill, M. (Ed.), The Handbook of Security. (pp. 532 – 561). London: Palgrave.
Elliot, D., Swartz, E. & Herbane, B. (2001). Business Continuity Management: A Crisis Management Approach. London: Routledge.
Emerald Insight Staff. (2004). Disaster Management. Disaster Prevention and Management, 13 (3), 218 – 225.
Engemann, K. & Henderson, D. (2012). Business Continuity and Risk Management: Essentials of Organisational Resilience. USA: Rosthstein Associated Inc.
HM Government. (2013). Emergancy Response and Recovery: Non statutory guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. London: Cabinet Office.
Howe, J. (2010). Project Initiation and Control. Hiles, A. (Ed.), Definitive Handbook of Business Continuity Management (3rd Ed.). (pp. 137-154). USA: Wiley.
http://www.thebci.org/index.php/resources/what-is-business-continuity
Miles, R. (2012). Empowering Emergency Responders. Bennett, S. (ed.), Innovative Thinking in Risk, Crisis, and Disaster Management. (14). Farnham: Gower.
Quarantelli, E. (1988). Disaster Crisis Management: A Summary of Research Findings. Journal of Management Studies, 25, 373-385.
Robinson, A. & Smallman, C. (2012). Risk as Workers’ Remembered Utility in the Late-Modern Economy. Bennett, S. (Ed.), Innovative thinking in Risk, Crisis and Disaster Management. Surrey: Gower Publishing Limited.
Singh, B.K. (2008). Handbook of Disaster Management: Techniques and Guidelines. Delhi: Global Media.
Underwood, S. (2010, February). Improving Disaster Management. Communications of the ACM, 18-20.
Wachtendorf, T. (2004). Improvising 9/11: Organisational Improvisation Following the World Trade Centre Disaster. (Publish Doctoral Dissertation). University of Delaware, Delaware.

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