The last two months have been prolific in the context of (among other things) counter-extremist and counter-terrorist initiatives, writes Adrian Jones.
We have seen the issue of the government’s Counter-Extremism Strategy, the new draft code of practice for Interception of Communications from the Home Office, and the new Draft Investigatory Powers Bill (Cm9152).
All of these pieces of draft legislation would appear to embody examples of best practice in principles of counter-terror and counter-extremism prevention and detection, and they appear to have learnt from lessons both going back as far as the Malayan Emergency of the 1940s and 1950s, and looking forward to anticipated developments and innovations in computing and communications. What would appear to be particularly encouraging is that they appear to have learned from the principles expounded by Sir Robert Thompson, one of the architects of the Malaysian victory in the 1950s, inasmuch as:
– They apply equally to all, including law enforcement agencies;
– They are limited in timescale. That is, they are subject to regular review to ensure that they remain proportionate and relevant in changing circumstances;
– They follow the principle of limiting only those ‘freedoms’ that are necessary to achieve the objectives of the exercise.
Many lobbies have already been up in arms, making a great noise about attacks on ‘personal freedoms’ and ‘civil liberties’, and the documents are barely a few weeks old. However, as Thompson stated, it is occasionally necessary that some freedoms need to be limited or curtailed in the short term, so that we may retain the other and greater freedoms that we enjoy in the long term. However, those curtailments should be limited in timescale and content, the curtailments should be rationally justified, and there must be checks and balances in place. To a point, the new strategy does this.
The argument here is not that the scope of these instruments is excessive, but rather that the legislators and drafters of the counter-extremism strategy have missed significant areas that need addressing. In particular, the scope of the strategy is extremely limited which, given that this is a document which may offer strategic guidance to us all for many years to come, (and new threats are likely to appear), it is somewhat short-sighted.
The strategy paper defines ‘extremism’ as … ‘The vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, (my emphasis), individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs ….’
After discussing the meaning of the definition, the document then goes on to offer a number of examples and case histories. Without exception all of these examples and case histories are drawn from either Muslim extremism, or right-wing extremism, and the solutions are nuanced along the same lines.
While it is absolutely right that these two phenomena should be tackled seriously, (and immediately), it is foolish to think (or give the impression) that they hold the monopoly on extremism, not to mention, (potentially) terrorism. We are only four decades since the ‘Years of Lead’ in Italy (involving both the left-wing Bigado Rossi, and the right–wing Armed Revolutionary Nuclei), Rote Armee Fraktion (Baader-Meinhof) in Germany, Action Directe in France and, although somewhat less frightening and lasting a much shorter period, The Angry Brigade in the United Kingdom, (initially closely linked to the Spanish May 1 Movement). These are only a selection of the European movements operating between the mid 1960s and the late 1980s – there were (and are still) many more groups operating outside of Europe.
The next logical statement must therefore be; ‘If these groups were last troublesome in the ‘70s and the ‘80s, do we really need to bother about their like now and, if we don’t, the counter-extremism strategy is quite appropriately nuanced and balanced.’ Such a statement would however be naive. It would also be a clear demonstration of our inability to learn from history, be it the history of the 1950s, the 1980s, or the 2000s.
There are many books and publications that trace the history of terrorist groups and individual (often ‘memorable or ‘charismatic’) terrorists within them, and there is a steadily building collection of material relating to contemporary groups and personalities. What is interesting, but not, I think, surprising, is that there are remarkable parallels between them. Although there are major differences in the use of technology, be it in the development of the internet-social media-communication, or the evolution of shaped explosives, the conflicts still tend to develop in similar ways and according to similar principles.
Look at the development and spread of Daesh and you could almost be reading chapters from the Seven Pillars of Wisdom, with liberal sprinklings from Lenin, Mao, Guevara, Marighella or Meinhof, (although some of the bloodier elements would be more in keeping with medieval horror stories). Look at the spread of propaganda and the rantings of ‘legal’ public speakers walking the knife edge of supposedly ‘legitimate’ or ‘academic’ debate, whilst clearly crossing the line into ‘vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’. As we will see later, these hate preachers are not limited to Daesh, or even fundamental Islam.
But Daesh and groups like them, (those before them, like AQ, and those that will undoubtedly follow), are not alone. Nor is the phenomenon new. Numerous historical commentaries have told us of right-wing individuals working within the democratic system but committed not to democracy, but rather to the ‘Führer-prinzip’, and left-wing groups and individuals (particularly some of those of Marxist-Leninist persuasion) committed to the revolutionary overthrow of democracy.
Such groups do still exist and can easily be found on the internet. Their commentaries, constitutions, statements of belief and rationalisations can be surprisingly frank. Whilst the Communist Part of Great Britain (Marxist-Leninist) seems reluctant to place its constitution where it is easily accessible, the Anarchist Federation (in their ‘Aims and Principles’) state clearly that they are ‘revolutionary class struggle anarchists’ and ‘the revolution will be a time of violence as well as liberation’.
On the other hand, Solidarity Federation, (it goes by the sobriquet ‘Solfed, which seems almost Orwellian in its undertones), states that it is a ‘Revolutionary Union Initiative’, appears shy about discussing revolutionary violence clearly. Using a more subtle approach, the tendencies and commitments to revolutionary violence are tucked away in complex numbered paragraphs, wrapped up in the language of ‘defending the revolution’ while never being quite clear about who it is that is going to start it, or when. All the same, the commitment to revolutionary violence is unequivocally there.
Colin Barker states the position of Socialist Worker (‘Can’t we win change through parliament’), in historical terms, and rationalises progress as being related to violent revolutionary force. He finds it remarkable that change was effected with so little violence, including the ‘moderation’ of Cromwell’s Model Army. Whilst he states that the objective is to ‘persuade police and soldiers to ‘come over to the people’, the alternatives are clear – the brick, the bullet, and the barricade.
These three examples do not represent an exhaustive catalogue of the material available, and they are of course exclusively left-wing. But it is not the job of this article to present arguments on the right-wing – they are already dealt with in the existing counter-extremism strategy. Even so, extending the scope of the strategy to include just left-wing extremism would not be enough – we also need to consider other extremisms – Christian extremism, atheist extremism, other religious extremists, national extremisms and a plethora of single issue extremisms. The scope of the strategy is too narrow, too exclusive.
In his book ‘Red Brigades – The Story of Italian Terrorism’, CM Meade Junior observes:
‘Revolution became imperative, a high moral obligation, an emotion-charged spiritual idea; and the young people bought the idea and all its spurious trappings, as these ‘bad teachers’ hoped they would, and the young people made the state tremble and the blood flow. The subversives in carpet slippers, the self-appointed spokesmen for the working-classes, thus have a very heavy share of the blame for the disaster that befell Italy, a moral if not a legal responsibility.’
So much for the ‘Years of Lead’. How easily can those sentiments be considered appropriate in contemporary developments? Of course, modern media technology makes the dissemination of such ideas easier and more difficult to counter but, arguably, we should consider how we can go onto the offensive. Surely, in these days of the ubiquitous hacker, it should not be impossible to infect, or bring down in other ways, the infectious poison being spread – the problem is how to do it without compromising the principle of free speech and debate. After all, we still need too to be able to challenge the poisonous ideas – and it is imperative that we do. How can those of a certain age forget the ridicule generated when terrorists and their mouthpieces were voiced over on television?
In summary, while the new counter-extremism strategy is sound in its basic principles, it is too narrow in its scope. Whilst the definition of ‘extremism’ is academically practical, the operational aspects are too limited insofar as the authors entirely miss significant activities and actors across the extremist spectrum. From this perspective the strategy itself fails to achieve its objectives. By referring to the preservation of democracy and liberty the strategy is a political document, and yet is misses significant extremist political players. It refers to respect and tolerance for all faiths and beliefs, but then deals with only one.
Adrian Jones is an independent security consultant with 35 years experience. A graduate of Leicester University, he is a member of IPSA and RUSI.
