Interviews

Safe audiences

by Mark Rowe

Delivering safe events has always been a difficult balancing act owing to the need to equalise the total experience expected by the customer with the safety and resilience of the event, writes Prof Chris Kemp, pictured, CEO of Mind Over Matter Consultancy.

Thus, event producers and managers are walking a tightrope between reduced enjoyment and a decreased resilience in the security of the event environment. To compound this, there is always the thought in the back of event planner’s minds of ‘why should we have to change what we do’. This is human nature and based on the key tenets relating to our freedom, our norms and our values. However, the terrorist ideology is not emanating from same norms and values and thus their attack methodologies are based on the destabilisation of the holistic vision of freedom which sits at the very core of our society.

To create a situation in which we can deliver a high level of resilience in a time of such violence, perhaps we have to deconstruct and reengineer the way in which we create, manage and deliver events and look at them from a different perspective. What exactly is the outcome that we wish to achieve, and how do we reach it given the context and the environment in which we now work?

The lessons learned from Manchester, Paris and other event atrocities are not clear as the nagging question in everyone’s minds is ‘would we have done it any differently or any better has we known the possible consequences’. To piece back together a shattered event is difficult, because we are all conditioned to provide events as we always have because they have always worked like this. Thus, the two questions that we must ask ourselves are, is there another way to deliver these types of event? And, what would this look like?

When first posing this as a question, it is clear that this is not just about the event it is also about the venue and whole context and event environment. Thus, the venue, urban planning, transport networks and crowded space movement are all key aspects in changing the way that we think. To become more resilient, we need to think like the terrorist and to view the pre, during and post event activity through their eyes. In this way, the landscape becomes different and the focus of our safety and resilience is attuned to the disruption that an attack would bring. Thus, by association we can construct a series of management protocols which clearly focus on the outcomes or worst case scenarios and can work backwards in the creation of an event delivery where those responsible and accountable understand the many and varied aspects which lead to such an attack.

To ensure that an event runs in a safe and resilient manner we have created an urban plan which ensures that people can move with ease of access to and from the event environment and thus the five phases of arrival, ingress, circulation/stasis, egress and departure all work like clockwork and people are taken into, around and out of the venue quickly, effectively and efficiently. However, what we have failed to grasp whilst creating these urban plans is that these configurations would also aid the terrorist in their mission to disrupt the very patterns that we are creating by the ease in which people can move through the urban space.

This is not a pop at the planners, because they have created venues, urban landscapes and transport hubs which enhance our lifestyle, ensure that we can move through spaces with the minimum of fuss and can support our ever-decreasing leisure time in the timeframe which we allot for such pleasures. The advent of building in counter terrorism measures and other technological advances into the built environment not only enhances safety but are the origin of the types of deterrent which have enabled us to; for a short while, destabilise terrorist activity. However, as soon as a barrier is placed in the way of the terrorist, they create other attack methodologies and modus operandi to challenge that barrier.

The first key aspect focus on is human nature. We are all creatures of habit. In my work at railway stations, festivals, events and other crowded spaces, I see the continual repeated behaviour of the public and the event stakeholders, where the key elements of build, delivery and break are all carried out in the same way every day. A prime example of habitual behaviour is the commuter. Commuter behaviour does not change from day to day. If there is disruption they will fight their way to the platform they always use, even if the train sits there for hours. They have no mechanism to take an alternative route. The only way to beat the terrorist or at least to be on a level playing field with them, is to think like a terrorist would. The terrorist constantly changes their methodology or at least varies it so that we are never sure how the next attack is going to be delivered.

If you look at the timeline of the last ten terrorist attacks in Europe they have used five different methodologies. These comprise. Vehicle borne IEDs (VBIED), Person borne IED’s (PBIED), placed IED’s, a vehicle to ram pedestrians and a vehicle from which to launch either a gun or knife attack. All of these have been successful for a number of reasons including, speed of delivery, lack of intelligence about the attack, the place where the attack occurred (surprise), the routine of those attacked or the way in which the attack was carried out. It is the element of surprise that is important here because as a nation in a venue or at an event, we don’t do surprise, we do normal and normal means predictable and thus the terrorist is already one to three steps ahead of us. The next terrorist methodologies may include the use of bikes and motorbikes, boats and planes and again it will be through surprise that the aggressors will make their mark. Thus, we only have three possibilities, firstly, to change the way we deliver the event. Secondly, to create a very high level of protection to ensure that vulnerability and risk is minimised to as low a level as possible. Or thirdly, to create a combination of these two elements to subvert as much as possible the possibility of an attack or to be ready for the attack if it takes place.

So where does this leave us? It leaves us at a point where we are not varying enough elements within our events and not making them resilient enough through mitigating both the physical and social challenges. Thus, we are not resilient enough and rely on others to protect our stakeholders and our venues which is not an ideal scenario. I am fully supportive of the police and how quickly they react, but they are struggling as these attacks multiply and their purpose is one of mitigating risk rather than stopping the attack. The police methodologies are fit for purpose, elements such as run, hide, tell, are laudable and this works in some venues. The Prevent strategy is key in preventing members of the community becoming terrorists. However, some of the events that are run such as outdoor festivals seem impossible to fully protect given their open plan, large gathering status. Outdoors, where can you run to? Where can you hide from gunfire or a bomb and who can you tell when if the comms systems are unreliable? We need to think again. We need to help the police and other services by creating our own methodologies focused on the safety of stakeholders and combining the physical mitigation factors with a variance in our human resource planning which proactively works against the terrorist rather than feeding the terrorist information and knowledge about our weakest points.

The first steps are simple. In a venue, we must focus not only on where we think an attack will most likely be targeted but more holistically at where our points of weakness are, and how we make these resilient to attack, no matter how far-fetched the possibility. If we discount drones for a moment, at an indoor arena or club we are basically looking at entrances and exits and their approaches plus their nearness to the transport delivery points as we have created fortresses with entrances and exits. A good ploy but with a key weakness, this is where an attack is most likely to take place.

Normally security managers would focus on which of entrances and exits are the most likely to be hit. The first thought would be, the main ones, as this is where the largest number of people are ingressing and egressing. At Manchester and in Paris the attack came through or at the entrances. In looking at these we need to identify what the terrorist is most likely to be looking at in terms of timeframe and mobilise our human resource appropriately. However, what does the terrorist focus on, is it just the maximum devastation at the main entrance for ingress or egress or is it to gain access to a point from which to conduct a more violent attack. Given the now often high level of HVM and security presence at main exit and entrance points, which smaller entry and exit points give access to the same number of people but through an alternative route. As an example, it is feasible that the build-up of hostile mitigation measures could mean that the premises have already been subject to hostile reconnaissance and that a second terrorist inside the venue may be able to open an emergency exit with ease allowing a perpetrator to enter and to cause untold damage.

To protect main ingress and egress routes there are three possibilities. Firstly, on ingress, where are the most congested targets. To identify these venues have regression statistics which can be explored to ascertain the generic and specific ingress profiles of similar artists and genres and to create predicted patters that can then be used to deploy resources at specific times. Although intelligent, it is unlikely that the terrorist will be in a position to glean such information externally. Thus, the venue holds important information in the patterns predicted for the event and by delivering extra resources at specific times to protect these areas the event security teams may be able to avert either an attack or stop hostile reconnaissance from taking place. From our work with both festivals and arenas it is clear that one can only create such statistics for individual venues because each venue has its own idiosyncrasies and these are also related to the genre of artist performing and the type of audience expected.

The second focus has to be when the event is at capacity. In such a cases, the terrorist would have to have gained access to the venue before the event or to be planning to bomb or shoot their way past the security team to gain access to either mount an attack during the event or have placed a device primed to go off when attendees are at their height. By careful sweeps, security protocols covering all vendors and vehicle/person access to the venue, the access to an aggressor entering the building before an event is reduced. The case of an armed attack is far more complex and a series of joint counter terrorism mitigation deliveries hand in hand with HVM would minimise such an attack from taking place. This would also call for a rethink of staff deployment which would be conditioned by the footprint of the event.

The third focus is at egress, this is when people are leaving or preparing to leave the venue with their guard down. The security has usually changed from ingress and watching the site mode to egress mode. This often means a reduction in numbers and a movement away from ingress and egress points to sweep the venue after the event finishes. This now needs to be rethought. The same protocols for the end of an event must be applied as at the beginning of the event to ensure coverage at all times during the five phases.

I have identified in this article three possible times when an attack could occur to gain most effect for the terrorist. The terrorist methodology is designed to create, maximum carnage. So, let’s deconstruct the protocols and return to the event managers and those putting on the event. Having worked at a number of high end venues and arenas recently I am always astounded at just how good the internal preparations for the event are, the sweeps, the intelligence and the customer service is excellent from those working in these spaces. I have no doubt that those working in the arenas are competent, know what they are looking for and are making sure that every possible focus is brought to bear on both any hostile reconnaissance elements and also any unusual behaviour, by buying in behavioural detection capacities from private security or the many and varied experts that deal in this area.

Creating an initial pseudo ring of steel around the event (taking a leaf out of the Paris Euro Football Championships) can pay dividends as then only ticket holders can get near to the event. However, the terrorist is only too well aware that the purchasing of a ticket is simple and gets them past the first ring if no search protocol is in place. This is a difficult situation as the cost of delivering such a ring of steel is high and often not the right kind of response to the perceived threat, backing up the theory that each event must be taken on its own merits and take into consideration the context and idiosyncrasies of the event itself must be taken into consideration.

So what is the answer to this conundrum? The answer is a two stage one. The first stage is to utilise a series of physical deterrents before during and after the event. Remember this is a business continuity cycle, it does not stop before or after an event it is continuous. There are people in the control rooms 24/7 watching what is going on in specific parts of the venue. However, the terrorist will be aware of the breadth of cover from cameras and will be looking to mount an attack or focus on their hostile reconnaissance from where they cannot easily be seen. Thus, movement of and the variety of deterrents is important to ensure that all bases are covered. Spotting and reporting behaviour as it emerges and identifying unusual patterns is key in supporting the holistic counter terror methodology. This however needs to be stepped up using irregular patrols, new methodologies and new ways of searching and questioning people to ensure that the aggressors are never sure of time, place or method of approach. This provides the first step, change, destabilising hostile reconnaissance.

The second stage is to actively use search protocols, and ingress procedures which reduce the queues but guarantee as far as possible that all of those approaching the event are thoroughly checked to ensure their credentials. Highlighting the police presence and security deployments with high vis gear and producing notices and messaging across the event warning of heightened search protocols and identifying what will happen inside the event once the public enter, (even if this is not the case) are key deterrents that will make the aggressor think twice when approaching the event.

The provision of hostile vehicle mitigation such as concrete blocks and planters or event permanent structures which can stop traffic entering a site are all possibilities, but again this is dependent on the amount of money that the venue and other stakeholders are willing to spend to create a platinum standard of safety and does the response by far outweigh the challenge. Are there other methodologies which are just as effective?

These are all questions that we must ask ourselves when considering the steps to be taken. All of these mitigating services make the audience and stakeholders feel safer and put pressure on aggressors to deliver. Running or empty CCTV cameras in situ around and throughout the venue are also an important deterrent whether they are connected or not. This deterrent was used at football stadia for years and they stopped many a fight and much aggressive behaviour just by their mere presence.

Thus, we can create strong pre, during and post event methodologies which are being varied dependent on the artist, genre and audience. We are putting in place strong behavioural detection methods. We are providing a series of physical deterrents for all known attack methodologies and some of those that are unknown. This variance from the norm has two affects. Firstly, it makes those attending feel safe and secondly, it makes the aggressor think twice about an attack.

However, there are still a number of challenges. The attack could be a marauding firearms attack (MTFA) which may be impossible to stop, but by not allowing vehicles close to the venue it becomes difficult for the attacker to create a base for their weapons. A car or a van is the perfect cover for such an attack as it provides a place to store and hide the weapons. If the nearest the attackers can get to the venue is the car park then you already have CCTV and other methodologies such as spotters in place, to alert the relevant authorities if an attack looks likely. In this way the chance of a successful assault is minimised.

The final aspect dealt with in this article relates to the security forces. They are well briefed, well-armed, well trained and ready for an incident. How ready are the security teams at the venue? It is true that they are often on the minimum wage, but how are we going to ensure that they get the requisite training to be professional members of the security community. That they can step up to the plate in some way to stop an attack taking place. This means having the knowledge and wherewithal to be able to escalate an issue if and when it occurs. Just a small amount of clear training can make this a reality.

Ensuring a safe environment in venues and transport interfaces is extremely difficult and only by using an interdisciplinary approach are we ever going to be able to provide a level of protection which will be sufficient to stop such attacks. The methodology will continue to evolve and we must think outside whatever box we believe in and constantly change what we do to make our crowded spaces as safe as possible in these desperate times. On a final note, we must also make sure that we do not shift the balance entirely from crowd management to counter terrorism measures or if an issue takes place such a shift in balance could have devastation consequences.

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