Interviews

Griffin – where next?

by Mark Rowe

Project Griffin is an excellent and established initiative – but is it reaching its potential? asks Adrian Jones mines into the past to see what we can learn.

Over the last few issues of this magazine we have seen some excellent reporting on Project Griffin, all of which reflects considerable credit on its volunteer members and those that support it. But, even so, a few questions need to be asked. Where does the idea of Project Griffin come from? Is Griffin, in its current configuration, achieving what it was meant to? And is Griffin achieving all that it might – or should – do?

In the steamy Malayan jungles of late 1940s there was an atmosphere of crisis. Communist guerrilla fighters, up until recently members of the MPLA (Malaysian People’s Liberation Army) who had been fighting the Japanese, were fighting what they described as an ‘Anti-Imperialist War’, and they were at that time enjoying some success. They were largely supported by Chinese Malay ‘squatters’, subsistence farmers who often lived on the edge of the jungle and who, often as the result of coercion or intimidation, supplied the terrorists with food, money (even though they had but little of either), recruits and (possibly of the greatest importance) intelligence. Indigenous Malay villages were also intimidated in the most horrific ways by the terrorists.

Forward-looking civilian and military personnel (some of them acting in an ‘amateur’ capacity) and intelligence officers identified quite early on what was occurring and, over time, they drew together a series of political and operational techniques which, together, developed into a holistic strategy. This strategy was designed to:

– Place the persons being targeted by the terrorists into ‘safe zones’ where they could survive, prosper and thrive. The ‘safe zones’ became known as ‘Strategic Hamlets’.
– Develop a sanitised cordon around the ‘Strategic Hamlets’ to prevent the terrorists from getting in, and preventing what they wanted from getting out.
– Create the conditions wherein the targeted people could defend themselves and develop skills, education and prosperity to build a stake in, and access to, a multicultural Malaysian economy.
– Incubate a relationship between the targeted people and the community and the authorities in general, building a mutually supportive society based on trust – a commodity which was sadly lacking at the beginning of the conflict (or ‘emergency’ as it became known).

Drawing parallels with the current ‘Daesh’ dominated insurgencies, its predecessors and possible successors, and the historical Malaysian situation, there are certain differences that have first to be acknowledged. The profile of the aspiring or active terrorist as a poorly educated, deprived and economically isolated individual is no longer accurate, if indeed it ever was. It would however sometimes be correct to surmise that circumstances may exist where they perceive themselves, for whatever reason, to be disenfranchised in some way.
And the concept of the ‘strategic hamlets’ is no longer acceptable, at least in a physical sense. That does not however detract from the usefulness and efficacy of the underlying concept – it may now apply more to the communications spectrum than the geographical location.

So what were the features, or tactics, of this strategy that was ultimately so successful at the time, and how can they be applied in parallel ways to today?

One of the features of the early stages of the Malaysian Emergency was a lack of trust – on both sides. On one side the Chinese Malay squatters may have the perception of, ‘I am Chinese, so I am not trusted – there is no path into society available to me.’ On the other side there may be an equally Manichean response: ‘He/she is Chinese, hence they cannot be trusted.’ These perceptions do not need to be universal to be damaging and counter-productive – fairly low levels of acceptance in strategic groups can effect culture and become pervasive. The architects of the defence in Malaya, among them Sir Robert Thompson, realised this. They realised that only way to ensure the long-term stability of the strategic hamlets and their residents was to offer them progressively rising levels of trust based on their demonstrating commitment to the government position. Thompson and his colleagues appreciated that it was necessary to take risks, and knew too that there would be some failures and betrayals on the long path ahead. However, in the balance of things, these risks were calculated to be worthwhile.

How do all of these things relate to the modern milieu and Griffin in particular?

We have had, for whatever reason, a low take-up of ethnic minorities in careers in the police force and, possibly to a slightly lesser degree, in the armed forces. True, serious efforts have been and continue to be made to try and address the situation. However, anecdotal material suggests that ethnic minority representation in the private security industry is high. Sadly, one of the things that is missing is reliable statistical data to support these statements, and it would be useful if the Home Office and (particularly) the private security industry could address this deficit. A research project gathering and analysing such data could be a suitable topic for one of the security research institutes.

Why does this situation prevail? Certainly, while somewhat dated, the Lawrence Report, with its allegations of institutionalised racism in the police still remains an influence, and UK participation in the war in Iraq did, to at least some degree, have the effect of fulfilling some of the more worrying predictions from within the security services. Occasional conversations with the author have indicated that even some of the wilder conspiracy theories have had an effect in casting doubt on western commentaries, with a consequent reduction of trust. Furthermore, these effects are not always confined to the less educated or least influential.

On the other side, while most police officers would seem to take a balanced view that the Muslim community in general is contributing in meaningful ways to the battle against religious extremism and radicalisation, the author has met a few who state a serious concern that Muslims take a position whereby they feel it is wrong to ‘inform’ on ‘brothers’ and, in consequence, they are less inclined to trust potential partners in that section of the community.

There is then a parallel with Thompson’s Malaya, inasmuch as at least an element of distrust exists on both sides of the spectrum. But, as Thompson taught us, risks have to be taken to address this distrust if the situation is to be remedied. In taking those risks we must understand too that there will be some setbacks – we must be careful of being too risk averse.

There is of course an established, respected and successful mechanism – a process, if you like – by which this distrust can be addressed. It is Project Griffin. When Griffin was conceived in the early 2000s it was visionary in its own way, but it was always somewhat limited in scope. This was necessary to ensure the support of business, since a deeper and open-ended commitment could impact detrimentally both on their bottom line, and on their ability to maintain resilient operations. Griffin started as a mechanism by which partners could be trained or educated in counter-terrorism awareness, including (later) the highly acclaimed Operation Fairway. Partners were also trained on cordon distances for particular types of threat and were subsequently issued with a high-visibility tabard emblazoned with the Griffin logo, and a lapel badge, (which became highly prized by the participants). The envisaged ‘pay-off’ at the time was that trained Griffin partners could act as cordon-support officers (a form of police auxiliary but with only civilian powers) in a major incident. The author has spoken to a number of Griffin trained partners over the years – and has yet to meet one that has ever been called out, even for an exercise. This could be one of Griffin’s few shortcomings – although I would welcome reports of any instance that shows this statement to be incorrect.

Over the years many people have shown a commendable public spirit in becoming partners in Griffin. They have shown that they are prepared, for no remuneration and at nil notice, to place themselves in situations exposing them to danger. Their only reward? A tabard, a badge, regular update briefings to keep them ‘ahead of the game’, and the knowledge that they have done a public service.

And, in this way, we have identified a committed body of people, mainly from the private security industry but also quite often from other walks of life – shop assistants, traffic wardens, medical staff, and others, from all classes and all ethnic groups, who are prepared to commit themselves to their belief that society as we know it is worth protecting. So why do we make such little use if this resource, and how might we otherwise use and develop it?

Griffin’s main significance is that it involves people right across the spectrum – including those very groups who may be under-represented in police and military recruitment campaigns. Many of them may already have skills that could be used in major incidents, including first aid and paramedic training, linguistic skills, fire and evacuation marshals, leadership skills and, most of all, commitment. The problem; there has not to my knowledge been any attempt to date to create a bank or a database recording these skills, nor any attempt to create a call-out or communications system for immediately accessing these skills when and where they are needed.

It should not stop there. We have a bank of a considerable number of ordinary extraordinary citizens who have demonstrated their commitment. And the bank is made up entirely of volunteers, people who represent every colour, creed, political standpoint and community in Britain. The measures that I have suggested thus far have been largely passive – they suggest using banks of skills and experience that already exist. It is argued here that we should also start using active measures – training this body of committed citizens in skills that we anticipate will or may be needed in a major incident.

What should these skills be? We would need to rely on forward-thinking emergency planners to assess this, but the list is only really limited by the number, willingness and capability of volunteers matched to the resources made available for such training. The skills could include decontamination, major trauma first aid, enhanced firefighting skills possibly including use of RBA [remote breathing apparatus], mass evacuation, and post-incident welfare. How far do our imaginations need to take us?

Of course, we would need to consider too the mechanics, logistics and finances of using and sustaining such an organisation. It has already been pointed out that employers cannot be expected to foot the bill for individuals called away as first responders. Equally, the author is concerned that in immediate and unexpected situations employers may be reluctant to release staff, and the staff themselves (whilst being public spirited) may be concerned over loss of income in what may already be low pay employment anyway.

In regard to the first point the solution may be unpopular. The release of the Griffin partners in given scenarios would need to be required by law, in a way similar to that required on release of reserve military personnel. The precedent may lie along the same lines as that required with Civil Defence personnel in the 1950s – and the parallel does not stop there.

The second point is somewhat simpler to resolve: Griffin personnel called for active duties, while being volunteers, would need to be paid a sum to compensate for their loss of earnings and possibly reflective of the specialist skills that they will be deploying during the emergency, for the duration of that deployment. Similar payment disciplines should be engaged whilst such staff will be on exercise practising their skills, since such an organisation would require to be exercised on a regular basis.

The investment in remuneration during active phases, including exercises, would not be without benefit to society however. The skills acquired during Griffin service would act as a useful motivation tool for recruitment, since they would enhance personal CVs and may open up new career development prospects in employments where professional training may be barely above legal minimums. Griffin would also provide opportunities to develop a new cadre of community leaders from a committed section of society.

The key to this debate is that Griffin should, indeed must, remain a civilian organisation under civilian leadership, while retaining its close links with police counter terror security advisers, if it is to retain public credibility and build up trust with communities that may consider themselves disenfranchised.

Picture by Mark Rowe; lion, Trafalgar Square.

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