From the July print issue of Professional Security magazine. Good design looks good and welcoming, and it can prevent crime. But how to achieve it? While the UK has done much good work in the field of designing out crime, are we going backwards?
A theme of designing out crime people is that the topic is advanced, whether you go for CPTED (crime prevention through environmental design) or the UK police’s Secured by Design. But: do non-security people get it; and even if they do, are the urban planners and architects building in security to their projects early enough, while at concept stage (still in the architect’s head). If not, retro-fitting of security much later might look like the ugly bolt-on that it is, and it costs much more, and it might not actually be as effective. Speakers at the Counter Terror Expo (CTX) covered the subject on the first morning of the show: the geographer Prof Jon Coaffee, and Nick Goldby of engineering consultancy Arup, whose work on the 2012 Olympic Park featured in the February 2014 issue of Professional Security. A former Met Police Counter Terrorism Security Adviser (CTSA), he remarked that ‘unfortunately’ the Government has taken the view that designing out crime is over-regulation.
Abu Dhabi example
Goldby began by pointing out what the built environment can look like: offering highly permissive access during an often extended working day, few ‘capable guardians’ whether private security or police compared to all the users; a predictable daily cycle; lots of back-house areas; good corridors for vehicles and people; and the ‘stand-off distances’ for barriers or bollards to stop vehicles being rammed at a building on purpose may be less than what security advisers would like. He quoted another CTX speaker, Stuart Williams, whose work on the Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning Manual (SSPM) featured in the April issue. Goldby noted the emirate has gone for regulation, to make builders include safety and security: “Unfortunately in the UK we are going the opposite way; the Government is reluctant to have any regulation and is reducing what is required.” As for having crime designed out early on in a project, Goldby did say that blast mitigation is now commonly accepted in developments; and hostile vehicle mitigation is not all steel and concrete. Clever design and landscaping is possible; and again Nick Goldby quoted from Stuart Williams’ examples in Abu Dhabi of softening of what can be hard and mechanical-looking designs. Goldby said: “I think the most important thing is early engagement with security professionals, from wherever they come from, the private sector of the police; people who understand the subject.”
Scale of threats
Goldby suggested thinking in terms of a scale of threats, from drunken anti-social behaviour to civil disorder, arson and terrorism. While terror if it happens can be more extreme, it’s less likely, and you might find it hard to justify anti-terror measures to an architect. The effect of vandalism might be more minor, but it’s more likely. Goldby recommended TARA (threat and risk assessment) giving an audit trail for decisions. Met Police CTSAs are working with architects and architecture students to give a flavour of issues in London, and how designing out crime can bring other benefits, such as energy efficiency and (in the case of blast walls) flood defence. Nick Goldby ran through some CPTED principles: natural surveillance, making it easy for those inside a building to see outside, whether at their car in a car park or a public place they are about to walk into; territoriality, a wall, a prickly hedgerow, even different-coloured bricks in the pavement, to subtly control public space, for example around an ATM cash machine; image maintenance, in other words graffiti unsettles people and suggests a place is not maintained; and target hardening. As he said, a lot of counter-terrorism and security is about target-hardening: “But you can do it so that it looks good.” Again he quoted Stuart Williams and Abu Dhabi, for use there of water courses and landscaping to prevent or deter access; in the UK, bicycle stands may be secure places for cycle users to lock their machines, and the stands can keep ram-raiders at bay. He spoke also of the 2012 Olympic Park; he was asked to look at legacy security, ‘and the design of what was a very open space, but restricted at Games time. It went from being a very controlled space with a high fence and 10,000 security officers to a more or less open park.” Now the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park, the buildings – the former Olympic Village – and the park have achieved Secured by Design (SBD) status from ACPO. That police body has also begun to license SBD consultants; Nick Goldby is one of the first.
Cost and benefit
Giving a more academic view, Jon Coaffee spoke of how the terrorist aim was to make crowded places – such as shopping malls, transport hubs, and sports arenas – sterile and empty places. Ranging over recent counter-terror design, he suggested it came down to a balance, ‘of effectiveness and acceptability’. Bollards, fences and CCTV can seal an area from car bombs, but might not be acceptable to the site owners, or users. Cost, and the look, also count. In an echo of Nick Goldby, Coaffee said that security input into an early stage of a design was better; retro-fitting was more expensive, and more complicated if there were various decision-makers. Cost too was hard to estimate, for instance for the maintenance of products after building. Developers, not obliged to do any security design, often resist on cost grounds, and there are questions of whether the owner should pay. Outside London, owners might even not want to think about such measures: “So the business case for counter-terror outside of high-risk areas is very tricky to make.” Like Goldby, Coaffee spoke of relating counter-terror to other benefits, such as reducing other crime, and climate change.
Unobstrusive is possible
Unobstrusive solutions are possible: he gave examples of street furniture outside the Gherkin in London; balustrades on Whitehall; and Arsenal’s Emirates Stadium. Where might counter-terrorism design go? Coaffee spoke of trends of physical, ‘in your face’ security; and more invisible security; and use of technology to predict people’s behaviour, such as the monitoring of faces for emotions, as was claimed by a system at the Sochi Winter Olympics in Russia (though Coaffee was sceptical that it could spot potential suicide bombers). He did suggest that we might see ambiences, or ‘affective atmospheres’ to make secured places feel less threatening.
Designing out crime works, but it helps to know what the building or site you are helping to design is really about, a consultant suggests.
Steve Woodroff is a member of the Association of Security Consultants (ASC). A slim Londoner, who spent his early years in Fulham, the former Armed Forces and Metropolitan Police Crime Prevention Design Advisor(CPDA) is also a cover PE teacher and athletics coach. He feels that his work in schools helps him to better understand what works and what doesn’t; what staff really need to do is their job without other outside interferences. He recalls work as a Met Police man within Barking and Dagenham schools in east London, which were suffering from burglaries, typically of new computers when the government launched the Information, Technology and computer initiative (ITC) for schools in deprived areas. The initiative was publicised by local media without giving a thought to the implications of those individual schools. Immediately, there was a high spike in burglaries, primarily of the new ITC equipment. The primary cause of the burglaries was that schools had outdated and ineffective security methodology which was no longer fit for purpose. Steve was working within the Planning and Regeneration department at the local authority and set up a working group to address the burglary and security problem. In short, he procured funding from the council, police and insurers (all with an interest in seeing less crime). As a template (with a view to a roll out scheme) he had installed Dallmeier CCTV, (linked directly to the Local Authority CCTV control room) into half a school that had been burgled on several occasions. Individual classroom access was by means of an electronic fob. Once a teacher pressed the fob, the alarm was set; and when it was ‘de-fobbed’, the alarm was off. For instance, most schools are open in the evenings for extra curriculum and adult learning (to gain much needed revenue for the school). It may be that during this period the school was only using 15 of 60 classrooms. The 45 classrooms not in use would remain actively alarmed. If an alarmed room was entered, CCTV and sensor-activated lighting would show the scene and beam live pictures to the Local authority CCTV control room and provide instant response if necessary. Laptop computers were stored in locked alarmed rooms within cages.
Furthermore it was more than apparent that the access control systems being used within the schools was totally inappropriate given the sophisticated and expensive equipment which was now being used. (notwithstanding the protection of persons using the facility, see Dunblane (Shootings); Maida Vale (Phillip Lawrence murder) and Wolverhampton (machete attack on nursery teacher).
Where practicable, main reception entrances to schools were fitted with an ‘air lock’ system where both doors would not be open at the same time to prevent direct access into the body of the school, except in case of fire. Reception staff also had direct visual control of the whole area including the approach to the main entrance. In addition, meeting rooms were built in to the ‘air lock’ areas to negate the need for parents to enter the body of the school in certain circumstances (where staff might have to meet parents over a child’s discipline). All rooms had panic strips and CCTV with a direct link to the reception office. In short, over a five year period and 57 schools, a 77pc drop in crime was achieved. In one year insurance claims went from £170,000 to below £10,000. Steve adds, “this was 10 years ago and is old hat now”.
As a cover teacher working in the southern home counties, he feels that by actually working in a particular sector, you can apply that practical experience. For instance, head teachers feel under pressure, for budgets and to meet government targets; a security adviser can work with head teachers to make life easier so that teachers can concentrate on what they do best, teach. “We don’t want schools to look like a military institution, we want them to be welcoming. But we need to put in subtle security mechanisms through effective design and security methodology, so that people don’t know they are there. But if they try to do something, they are deterred or get caught.”
Though he has used CCTV against theft and for staff safety, he adds: “I still believe that it doesn’t matter what security equipment you have got; if your staff are not properly educated in the use of that equipment, it’s useless.” Likewise it’s no good how many courses you go on in the subject; you have to apply it, learning from experience and appreciating that – to stay with the case of schools- teachers and pupils have to work in places and feel safe. Nor is designing out crime something done once and for all; Steve speaks of returning to places even 15 or 20 years later, to look at how sites have changed and see if they have passed the test of time. Because you don’t have to re-invent the wheel all the time.
The term ‘ quick kills’ is commonly used by those who wish to be seen as doing something to improve an area but ultimately they don’t work. For example; removing graffiti , cutting back foliage and adding a few locks etc. initially there is an instant improvement, however, it is often short lived. That said, designing out crime alone may not provide the answer, sometimes you have to take a step back and look to a multi-faceted approach to problem solving. This can include multi-agency involvement to specifically target individual problem areas within that community. ie; police targeting prominent criminals; regular patrols to reduce fear of crime and to get to know the residents through workshops; make the area more aesthetically pleasing through maintenance of green areas and recreational space; improve lighting and natural lines of sight. Once you feel that residents start to take ownership you can scale down the agency involvement but ensure a long term maintenance plan .
Designing out crime principles are proven to work, in practice and according to academic research; We only have to look back at the pioneering work carried out by people like Newman, Jacobs, Poyner and Webb but to name a few. Here he quotes the work of Dr Rachel Armitage, whose book Crime Prevention through Housing Design was reviewed in the January issue. What works in one school, or housing estate, may not work in another. “Every area you go to is site-specific; there is always something environmentally different about it. And although you can use methods from one area to another, you might have to alter or tweak them to suit that particular environment; and it might have been a development which was only across the road.”
Site-specific designing out crime is something the British have done for centuries without the name; take Georgian, Victorian and Edwardian rows of terraced houses in cul de sacs with iron railings defining public and semi-public space; communal garden areas for residents only, set between the fronts of houses and protected by a boundary treatment of ornate iron railings which require little maintenance. Back-to-back houses prevented access to the rear of the properties. However, when access paths were incorporated at the rear for bins, coal and garden access, crime increased due to the anonymity it provided to the criminal. These areas became crime-ridden. since these times gating the alleys have greatly reduced opportunities for crime (defensible space).
“You don’t need cameras everywhere, I think Big Brother is too much. Everywhere we go we are reliant on cameras; a camera is only good if the mark one eye-ball is watching it every second otherwise it becomes reactive.” If the built environment is right for the way we want to live, do we want CCTV out there? Steve doesn’t think we do. “there is a place for everything and CCTV has provided crucial evidence in the past and no doubt the future but we can’t have cameras on every corner, what does this say about our society” . If you get design right, such as the site layout, see and be seen security methodology, lay-out of roads and footpaths that do not provide where practicable, opportunities for the criminal, giving good natural lines of sight, doors and windows that give good resistance to attack, you can reduce the opportunities for crime, he argues, before anyone lays concrete on the ground. “Designing out crime works and doesn’t necessarily mean it will be a burden on the pocket.” It is important to look and think long term.
And yet he feels that the Coalition Government is causing the UK to go backwards on designing out crime. ” If you look at the Localism Act (2011) and the National Planning Policy Framework (DCLG 2012) there is very little direct reference to designing out crime or secured by design. In an attempt to ‘streamline’ the planning system, key planning policy statements have been removed which include; PPS1 delivering sustainable development and PPS3 housing.”
The work in Abu Dhabi of the Urban Planning Council (UPC) as featured by Stuart Williams in the April issue of Professional Security, makes Steve feel ashamed and embarrassed that the UK is, perhaps giving up on designing out crime in new house-building, for the sake of letting some house-builders build cheaply. “Whether this is for political reasons or otherwise I don’t know. If people think they don’t have to do something, (namely developers working according to designing out crime and secured by design principles) they won’t do it and yet I have had the pleasure of working with developers who go out of their way to achieve the best they can ”. Steve believes that in his humble opinion designing out crime should be made mandatory within the UK planning system so that everyone has built in security methodology through environmental design. ” This can be achieved by planning departments, security advisors, architects and the building industry buying into it and working together to provide safe, secure and sustainable environments. Ultimately, good design at the conception stage is passed on to the occupier and assists in the overall reduction of criminal opportunity. We should stop talking about it and do it.”
