Interviews

A more active Griffin

by Mark Rowe

After asking last issue whether it was time to morph Project Griffin into a more active entity, the consultant Adrian Jones asks if that’s either necessary or desirable and, if so, why? (Pictured: lion, Trafalgar Square)

I will be referring to this concept as a ‘Civil Assistance Organisation’, or CAO, so that the concept does not get too hung up on and confused with Griffin as it stands. After all, whilst Griffin seems to be the most appropriate and established platform or foundation, it is not ‘broken’ – so maybe it should be complemented rather than changed?

As mentioned by Mark Rowe in his editorial in the March 2016 print issue of Professional Security magazine, the object of this series of articles, (of which this is the third), is to stimulate debate, writes Adrian Jones. The first two articles (a comment on the new Counter-Extremism Strategy, followed by an examination of historical lessons from the 1940/50’s Malaysian Emergency), both contained some controversial ideas. It is hoped that readers will be triggered by these (either by corresponding through the letters columns, or by entering their own articles), into sharing their own ‘out-of-the-box’ thoughts and experiences, and thus build a professional debate to complement those being put forward by more formal organisations and ‘think-tanks’.

Over the past 40 years, and particularly over the most recent 20, the nature of terrorist attack has fundamentally changed. While the old style of attack has not gone away, (we are particularly likely to see it again as we pass the 100th anniversary of the Dublin Easter Uprising), the emphasis or objective has changed from one of mainly economic damage to one of horrifying and maximised human carnage. Whereas previous manifestations of terrorism displayed, in a perverted sort of way, a consciousness of public opinion, the contemporary manifestation is the opposite. It seems that every effort is strained into offending public opinion, disregarding any concept of mercy or humanitarianism, with the intended consequence being the creation of raw fear and hatred. In this, Daesh have shown themselves to be particularly innovative in the field of horrifically intimidating video clips. Co-ordinated no-warning multi-point attacks have now become commonplace, on the Washington-New York-Virginia axis, or in Nairobi, London, Madrid, Mumbai, Sousse or Paris.

What developments are likely to occur? On March 7, Mark Rowley (National Policing Lead for Counter-Terrorism) told us that Daesh (IS) are planning ‘enormous and spectacular’ attacks, and ‘not just the types that we’ve seen foiled to date’. Such attacks are likely to be based on returned cadres of trained and radicalised fighters, including females, and that police and intelligence agencies are alert for this. In this context the words of the IRA statement after the 1984 Brighton Bomb still have some resonance; ‘Remember we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always.’

There are other worrying trends too. Cited in Security Management Weekly (11/3/2016), Cooper and Schmidt of the New York Times (9/3/2016) observe that Daesh have already managed to source a chemical weapons (sulphur mustard) capability, and there is evidence that such capability may have been weaponised and deployed, particularly on the village of Taz in the Kirkuk region of Iraq. Indeed, it is reported that US Air Force assets have been directed against these targets. Other news reports indicate that Daesh has been attempting to create a ‘dirty-bomb’, although apparently without success so far (such a project is not by any means easy). However, their intentions seem clear, and they are on the list of suspects for stealing some 10 grams of a radioactive isotope (Iridium-192) from a facility near Basra, Iraq, (although this quantity is reportedly believed to be insufficient to create a viable device). If anyone doubts the political will to use such weapons, it should be borne in mind that Wm Robert Johnson (2013-2015) lists some 17 poisoning attacks (on girls’ schools) in Afghanistan between March and July 2012, resulting in 1387 (luckily, non-fatal) casualties.

Even if Daesh do succeed in developing such a capability, they still have the problem of infiltrating the device into their selected target area(s). This opens a whole new range of debates relating to efficacy, resourcing and structure of border and port controls and international co-operation. These subjects are not covered by this series of articles, but readers may be assured that they are on the agenda, and other news articles and press releases evidence that Europol, Interpol and the Home Office are actively ‘on the case’.

Joining these strands together then, it seems possible that at some time, sophisticated no-warning multi-point attacks, maybe hybrid in nature (mixed conventional-CBRN) and using a substantial number of combatants, and possibly occurring in a major western population centre, become an eventuality for which we must plan.

The scenario that I now draw for you is based on a range of incidents spread over some ten years, and particularly London 2005, Mumbai 2008, Mumbai 2011, Kano 2012, Paris January 2015, Sousse 2015, and Paris November 2015. While London 2005 might be considered the ‘odd-one-out’ inasmuch as there were four co-ordinated but effectively single point attacks, rather than the ‘rolling’ profiles of the others, the initial paralysing of the infrastructure was similar.

In this scenario set in a major city on a midweek evening, several terrorist combat teams from three combat groups attack a number of targets widely spread. As in Paris, the scenario commences with one attack and others roll in behind it at predetermined intervals. Casualties are sustained in each of the attack areas, and a major incident is called at 15 minutes in, whilst other attacks are still developing. At 23 minutes in, ambulance personnel state their view that one of the casualties may be suffering from some form of toxicity. Attacks are still developing elsewhere, including suicide bombings and single actor marauding attacks, (including one on a first responding ambulance). At one suicide bomb site fire and rescue personnel report initial sampling of higher than usual levels of background radiation at 50 minutes in, and three sieges have been established – one west of the city centre, one three miles away to the south and one in a hotel in the city centre itself. A state of emergency is declared. Marauding attacks continue moving across the city for two hours, and at least one location a suspect is known to have disappeared into the Metro-subway system. Two of the siege responses retake the hostage sites at two and a half and four and a half hours respectively, but there is heavy loss of life and many injuries. The third siege, Mumbai style at a hotel, continues beyond the end of the scenario. While most of the terrorists are killed in gunfights or by suicide action, one terrorist is taken alive and makes the claim that they have exploded a dirty bomb.

A nightmare scenario, yes, but one in which the timeline is most likely somewhat optimistic, and the marauding attacks and single actor suicide bombings may not yet be over, (certainly their effects will be felt long after the attacks have dissipated). What will the condition of the operational response be at this stage?

The situation with the police at this stage is likely to be critical, and it is more than likely that the military will already be deeply involved – especially Special Forces hostage response units. Military helicopter units will be deployed due to the number of incident centres and the need to live-track suspect marauders, and Heli-borne medivac units may be needed to assist with critical casualties. Police resources will be saturated with the sheer number of crime scenes and the need to maintain safety cordons. Traffic for some distance outside of the city centre will almost certainly be gridlocked, and it is likely that the terrorists will have anticipated this (they will possibly be depending on it). Bomb disposal resources, civil and military, will be saturated. The toxicity and radiological reading reports will take all CRBN resources and will cause urgency in the response combined with some caution in operations – where indeed they are able to get through, (hopefully this will not be an issue for the local Fire and Rescue services, but they will quickly reach full capacity). An outer cordon with road blocks will need to be set and staffed by military personnel, and may in some cases almost certainly require armed military support (police firearms units will be occupied to full stretch in the centre).

City centre hospitals, ambulance and paramedic resources will have reached capacity fairly early in an incident of this scale. Centres and resources from adjoining towns and regions will need to be called upon, but the traffic gridlock will greatly increase response times and in some instances response may become virtually impossible except where it is possible to link with operable parts of the Metro-subway. Movement within the combat areas is likely to be mainly by foot or motorcycle, and in any event will be slow by normal standards. The situation on the Metro-subway is likely to be changeable and cautious until such time as an attack there occurs. There will be tendency to confine public journeys away from the known combat zones for the time being, although it may be necessary to commandeer trains for casualty evacuation and use incoming trains, where they exist, to bring in additional resources. There may be debate on whether or not the system should be shut down, but it is decided to continue using operable lines as long as it is possible to do so, and for as long as trained volunteers can be found to run them.

So how might we plan to mitigate the length and effects of such an incident? It should be remembered that this article is about additional resources beyond those deployed as ‘routine’ in a major incident. This is important because certain pessimistic assumptions have been made:

– Due to the sheer scale of the incident, all available resources are deployed in the early stages. Operational fatigue will eventually set in, after the adrenalin starts to wear off.
– Road gridlock sets in very quickly.
– Emergency service take-over of the communications systems occurs within the first hour.
– Emergency services – particularly Fire and Rescue and ambulances are at full capacity very early and in any event can only move slowly. The toxicity and background radiation alerts exacerbate the situation, and the suicide attack on an ambulance does so further.

In this scenario and at this stage we have reached the stage where the police (including the transport police) and the military are concentrating on their first priority and what they are best at – responding to and containing the fluid combat situation. Police auxiliaries are deployed in the first instance on cordon control and in the second on crime scene preservation, but are over-extended in these duties. At this point a Civil Assistance Organisation (CAO), if one is available, becomes critical. Made up of volunteers living and working locally, trained in specialist tasks, managed by locals trained and selected locally (and ‘civilian’ in every respect), and equipped through locally placed resource caches and centres, (on the old principle of ‘Battle Boxes’), with excellent local knowledge of infrastructure and geography, these adaptable and committed individuals could undertake key roles to support and assist the regular emergency services.

The idea, of course, is not new. As Mark Rowe observed in the March edition of Professional Security the role is not unlike that of that played by the Civil Defence Corps in the 1950s, although the concept that I am suggesting here is more ‘Hodges’ than ‘Mainwaring’ – more ARP (Air Raid Precautions) than Dad’s Army, that is. Given the resurgence and truculence of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, (not to mention the planned modernisation of his nuclear arsenal), is the regeneration of the principle of Civil Defence so outrageous?

In particular, the key roles played by the CAO could include:

– Maintaining local Field First Aid Stations and Clearing Centres. Trauma trained volunteers could be based at these sites, and blood donations could take place there, too;
– Setting up and maintaining Welfare Centres to assist individuals isolated because of the attacks or break-downs in the transport system, and also assisting emergency service personnel on a sustained period of duty. This could include providing temporary sleeping accommodation, food, and communications and IT links to relatives where such links are still available, (possibly subject to limitations).
– Local air and environmental sampling for CRBN;
– Passing real time local intelligence, including on one hand casualty statistics and air sampling data and, on the other, movements of suspect terrorists, to Control Centres;
– Assisting (or wholly) staffing second tier cordon lines, and possibly setting up diversions and controlling traffic too (coordinated through police operations control);
– Local firefighting (in the literal sense);
– Maintaining a temporary missing and lost persons information centre.

As I stated in my last article – how far do our imaginations need to take us? But the process needs to be started now.

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