The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games were a success: offenders were deterred, and the design proved proportional and cost effective. The challenge now is, in a word, legacy: of the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park, in Stratford, east London. Nick Goldby of Arup, pictured, writes.
This article is abridged from Safer Communities, Volume 12, issue four, covering ‘Designing out Crime’.
The Olympic Park is at the junction of four London boroughs; Waltham Forest, Newham, Tower Hamlets and Hackney. The Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) was formed to build the infrastructure for the London 2012. The future Stratford City Shopping Centre would be developed by the Australian company Westfield. The ODA would become the developer for the Olympic Park on the west of the site. The economic downturn in the UK led to strict financial controls on the ODA’s budgets, whilst also affecting the prospects of legacy homes being sold privately. Therefore, at a mid-point in the project build it became necessary for the ODA to take over finance of the Olympic Village altogether, further squeezing an already tight budget – including security. t was necessary to review the security component of the development and apply value-engineering principles to reduce their cost impact on the project. In spite of, or even perhaps because of, these financial pressures, it was possible to use the Secured by Design (SBD) approach to ensure that effective security would be designed into the whole project. This was achieved by building additional mitigation upon a sensible base level of legacy security only where justified by risk and mitigative values. The planning applications for the Olympic Park were one of the largest sets of planning documents ever submitted in Europe and covered 240 hectares, and 17 kilometres of perimeter fences.
The ODA’s security responsibilities were identified early within the project as the mitigation of security risks in new venues and infrastructure by designing them out wherever possible. This included the identification of security requirements for, and the delivery of, physical security infrastructure and systems for venues, public realm areas and access to the Olympic Park. The ODA also conducted security operations until they handed over responsibility for the Games operations to LOCOG (London Organising Committee Olympic Games). The commitment to design the Olympic Park in accordance with SBD was supported by Government and embedded as a key performance indicator. Public endorsement was evident at ministerial level. The ODA Security Team included security advisors from Government, the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), and the police (Metropolitan and provincial forces). A number of security, risk and resilience professionals were seconded to the ODA from a number of private UK security consultancies.
Design process
The premise for the threat would be primarily intelligence led but it was recognised that the relative ‘iconic’ status of the event would have its own attractiveness and risk associated with it. Threats can emerge with little or no notice leading to unpredictability and the security regime had to be able to adapt. A broad spectrum of threats ranged from petty crime and public order situations to terrorism. However, it was also recognised that there was need for proportionality in mitigation measures as the Games were a transient event and the legacy risks were enduring. The approach adopted would be to profile crime activity within 500 metres of the Olympic Park (or other venue’s boundary) and to keep this profile regularly updated. Local crime data was mapped to establish an east London crime profile. The Park and surrounding areas were mapped for threat and risk using a grid system to identify potential criminal activities and vulnerable points. These areas were then analysed and, where possible, the opportunity designed out or a specific security solution provided. This would provide a clear baseline security for the Park. Residual risk, if it was not designed out, would require significant extra operational security, particularly manned guarding, which was seen as a higher cost. Very early in the project it was suggested that the predicted guarding numbers required without smart design, would be unachievable owing to the numbers required. This was ultimately justified as it reduced further drain upon the UK military when the private sector proved unable to even deliver the required number of guards for baseline operations. Technology-based screening processes were used which took less time to process access control, involved fewer personnel to operate the control gates and was less intrusive than regular searches. SBD was accepted as a wrapper for these elements of design security:
l crime;
l resilience;
l void certification – the searching and sealing of inaccessible spaces on build completion (to reduce the need for further security searches at a later date); and
– accounting for public order.
Thus, by making SBD a contractual requirement (and planning condition), it was possible to assure delivery of all aspects of security. The Olympic Park was designed and built as separate projects; most had no remit outside of a one-metre strip around the building. SBD advisers facilitated the join up of security designs between projects.
The original approach to SBD and the Olympic Village was by voluntary agreement. Security was intended to address only “normal” volume crime, leaving a security residual gap, to be filled by an operational overlay of security for the Games. With the ODA now providing extra funding for the Village, it required a shift towards a security design to address residual risks in a similar way to that adopted for the main Olympic Park. This led to friction between security designers, the ODA and developer Lendlease. The way forward was eased by the use of the original well-documented ‘traditional’ approaches to SBD to support more complex solutions, most to mitigate explosive blast and firearm attacks.
Quotes such as “this is just a temporary building” were often presented in the early discussions around security overlays. This opinion an attempt to reduce spending on what was seen as high cost design security as being unnecessary or not cost-effective when guards could be deployed. Some project managers and construction teams responded better than others to this strategy and this was reflected in the secure design of non-legacy and very temporary venues such as the basketball and water polo venues. An example would be positioning of fresh air intake vents out of reach, or unavailable, to remove the opportunity for terrorists or ‘white powder’ hoaxers to introduce chemical, biological or radiological material into venues. Availability of LOCOG staff to participate regularly in early to mid-stage security design reviews was an issue. Security designs were based upon a LOCOG venue requirement, which was set early in the process, and design meetings would lack informed client review. Iconic designs required unique security solutions for even basic building elements, such as windows or enclosures.
It was seen as vital to keep a venue specific security record of operational requirements, progress and any changes, a list that could be used for assurance checks and was transferable for legacy use post-games. Sometimes a conflict between legacy and games requirements required a resolution. For example, in venue glazing the most easy option would have been to include toughened glass in the outer pane of double glazed areas with a polyvinyl butyral (PVB) laminated inner pane throughout (the usual blast mitigation in the UK). However, the police delivering the SBD accreditation encouraged blast engineers to design the lowest three metres of glazing with an inner and outer skin of PVB laminated glass. A further example was switch and server rooms, far larger than needed for legacy. A mixture of permanent and demountable resilient walling products were used. Hands-on reviews by the security team, using the venue-specific security designs, allowed them to identify any shortfall and deal with snags. A secure room in one stadium was found to have been made in drywall rather than block work and needed to be rebuilt.
The landscape of the Park was identified as a vital element of the design and would be seen by spectators. Thus, the landscape design had to be visually interesting but yet be capable of being secured and able to be searched effectively. This was achieved by selecting the right park furniture. Park fences would have clear strips either side of them to allow clear lines of sight and similarly semi-mature trees were used wherever possible so that they did not compromise CCTV. All of the main paths, particularly where these passed over or under bridges, or underpasses, would have no blind corners. Bridges would have protected bearing galleries, angled flanges on their ‘I’ beams to prevent concealment of devices and clean lines to support easy search.
Olympic Park Fence
With the five metres high fence running for 15 kilometres around the entire perimeter it was necessary to identify and secure all drains, culverts, service pipes and utility services crossing the boundary. The secure ‘clean’ areas behind the fence were mapped and inspected where required mitigations reduced the risks from simple temporary tack welds on manhole covers to the sealing of service pipes. Waterways and railway lines had to be considered and where necessary, bespoke booms and barriers put in place.
To mitigate threats from vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) is a significant challenge. It was necessary to identify what realistic options were available for vehicle stand-off distances. Where possible the Hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) barriers were within the Park and alongside associated screening for vehicle search. When seeking authority to install HVM in public areas the public town planning committee meetings were held with only relevant persons present and information redacted to ensure security was not compromised. Stand-off distances achieved around the site and the maximum credible vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) were then used on which resilience (blast-resistance) was needed to be designed into venues.
The final element in the security determination was an assurance process to identify achievement or not of the original security operational requirement. Virtually every security overlay and designs would be scrutinised by security advisers, from CPNI, the in-house ODA teams or private security consultants. Despite established legacy security conditions, in particular with the SBD criteria being set out within legacy planning conditions, there was no movement of Olympic security team into the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) to continue the legacy security. Clearly the security risks associated would be very different post-games, determined by local crime. In November 2012, the OPLC commissioned an independent review of its security position. The OPLC appointed an interim head of security, seconded from the independent reviewers. In reality not a single HVM measure from Games time has been retained in situ for the legacy. Many CCTV cameras have had to be added to the legacy provision to provide coverage for new activities, with many others being repositioned. Many of the SBD elements have been seamlessly transferred into the new operations.
