This article by Richard Waight, pictured, explores some key academic theoretical assumptions about the human complexities of making effective decisions in pressured environments; with feedback from experienced practitioners.
Abstract
In doing so it exposes components that may help produce effective crisis decision makers. It finds important academic psychological and cognitive theory sparingly understood and poorly integrated with crisis management; consequently, practitioners tend to think of crisis decision effectiveness in terms of process, procedures, and action rather than the behaviours and characteristics which enable them. However, preferred individual traits, and more discrete trait behaviours, are found alongside other core attributes. Some are learned, others are probably innate, however aspects of both may well be overlooked in training and in selection processes.
Introduction
Over the last decade the growth of new high risk technologies, human system interfaces, globalisation, population growth, climate change and socio – economic structures have made our world a more dangerous place than ever before (De Smet, Lagadec & Leysen, 2012). The likelihood of crises is less predictable, more probable, complicated, destructive and stressful. Consequently, in the 21st century, few organisations are without resilience strategies methodically supported by appropriate plans, policy and procedures to counter likely critical incidents. Yet, despite this, the best laid contingencies are continually found wanting and incidents turn to crises as responses fail or the coincidence of events go beyond comprehension and the consideration that risk assessments and contingency plans have anticipated.
A loss of control tests the very fabric of individual decision-making processes outside the plans and procedural boundaries, whilst the extraordinary environment increases stress and the margin of possible human error. Thus, they carry unique problems requiring distinctive decisions. Exploring what constitutes the necessary components of an effective Crisis Decision Maker remains a crucial factor in selecting the right people, delivering the right training and maximising the chance of success.
Although resilience strategies, procedures and processes are vital, crisis situations require someone who can apply more than just pre-planned answers. It needs someone who expects and embraces the new and the novel. ‘’We need them to accept strange signals and ‘impossible’ scenarios, to enter strange seas without being paralyzed by the absence of maps’’ (Topper & Lagadec, 2013). The complexity of crises is such that an agreed definition does not exist: rather a general understanding prevails that it is an environment of ill – structured mess (Dayton (Ed), Mitroff, Murat, Green & Green, 2004) and maverick reality impossible to understand and grasp (Topper & Lagadec, 2013). It is in this ‘mess’ that individuals must decide and act under extreme pressure in a climate of unknowable unknowns. Unsurprisingly evidence suggests human behaviour, judgement, decision making and team dynamics are causes or contributors to a crisis situation (Janis, 1982, Fink, 2002, Borodzicz, 2005, Gladwell, 2008) or is made worse by human error (Boin, 2004) and the nature of the individual (Reason, 1990).
If we are to properly counter this threat, then understanding the interplay between individual behaviour, decision making, stress and the crisis environment is critical and so too is examining if there are particular human attributes best suited to cope and respond more effectively in such situations. This article explores some key psychological elements of this complex issue to draw an academic theoretical perspective beside which the considerations of expert practitioners from different organisations: Military, Civil Aviation, Clergy, Retail, Marketing, Police, Banking, RNLI , Offshore Sailing, Executive Coaching and the National Health Service (NHS), with between 20 to 40 years experience in their profession and over 325 years’ collective management experience, are considered. To further corroborate evidence, practitioners were asked to choose words from the lexicon used in the Abridged Big – Five Dimensional Circumplex (AB5C) Model (Hoftsee, De Raad, & Goldberg,1992) set against the ‘big five’ personal characteristics of the Five Factor Model (FFM), which in their experience, most represented the behaviours of effective crisis decision makers.
Practitioners’ view
Given the broad range of academic theory that links many key personal attributes in crisis decision making with behaviours and traits, it is significant that practitioners appeared to view the efficiency of crises decisions as action based rather than shaped by particular traits or behaviours that may enable an individual to make specific decisions or act in a certain way; ‘’They just got on and did it’’ and ‘’I never considered how an individual’s behaviour affected the outcome’’ showed a surprisingly limited depth of understanding in what makes people do what they do.
This mindset seemed rooted in the considerable importance given to crisis decisions conforming to the pre existing plans, procedures and process, and maintaining a transparent audit trail to keep shareholders and governing bodies happy; ‘’decisions outside the processes or procedures are rarely considered appropriate courses or are kept within relatively tight boundaries, indeed for many organisations it would be unacceptable’’. Even those whom worked in occupations like the RNLI, Aviation, Sailing or the NHS, who regarded a crisis as more immediate and personal, felt most responses were learned through extensive training that provided the knowledge, experience and situational awareness to act, albeit sometimes intuitively, within known processes and Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs).
Of course the benefits of highly considered processes and SOPs are extensive, they ostensibly narrow the margin of human error, assist the mental decision process and act as de stressors. But, rather reluctantly and paradoxically, a quiet concern did emerge that contingency plans, procedural guidelines and in some cases government regulations could perceptibly, or actually, stifle the cognitive abilities and courage to improvise, think outside the box and allow the wherewithal to act counter-intuitively. They could in some circumstances and with certain types of people even add to the risk of failure. ‘’Organisational procedures and systems are crucial, but there are those who simply can’t deviate even when the situation calls for something new. What is needed when the situation doesn’t conform to the contingency plans is a maverick, unorthodox individual who is not frightened of taking the risk and do something different’’. The view by both academic and practitioner that unique crisis events seem to call for the inherent attributes of creativity, intelligence, positive mental attitude, sharp enquiring intellect and maverick tendencies to create unorthodox and novel solutions, is perplexing because a broad culture of understanding, and encouragement to do so appears, with best intentions, somewhat curtailed. It raises a question if organisations are placing enough emphasis on these certain personal attributes when selecting for crisis decision taking posts and to what extent they may be subconsciously discouraged and underdeveloped during training?
Of course the experience and knowledge that drives the intuitive element will only be as powerful as the individual capability to rationalise and reflect on past decisions and to learn and develop the right lessons without prejudice. And here academia and practitioner agree. Many of the participants acknowledged a contemplative style, but most had learned from their failures far more than their successes, while some found they learned more through others’ mistakes; reading historical accounts, organisational reviews and business journals. Only one did not learn from success, only failure. So it appeared that for effective intuitive responses, relevant experience remains the key element and the more arduous a journey to obtain it the more clear, valuable and accessible it may be. The problem is that organisations are pretty averse to mistakes, more so if they are non – procedural, consequently those who learn the hard way may not remain in their positions – they should. Perhaps this emphasises the ever important role that training, learning and development must play in evolving and honing, not just skills, but the behavioural attributes as well.
A few practitioners considered that key fundamental attributes, like honesty, moral and ethical integrity and courage, were formed at an early age and moulded by the influences on environment, be it at home, school or with friends, transposed on an individual. But interestingly, they thought those from privileged and powerful backgrounds or, far less fortunate and challenging environments, were equally, but specifically likely to hold the more desirable characteristics and behaviours required of a decision maker. Why?, in part because of the nurtured mental resilience, toughness, confidence and self efficacy, that these backgrounds give, and which seem to engender a robust inner belief and determination to succeed. However it was recognised that these strengths, if excessive, can also manifest themselves as weaknesses if not controlled, over confidence, arrogance or hubristic tendencies being revealed as dogged denial, or a lack of holistic consideration and inaction; thinking the crisis is already under control. But most revealing was a strongly held view that whatever the characteristic or behaviours, an individual had to be grounded and balanced by an emotional stability, or Emotional Intelligence, particularly, a deep self awareness, and empathy.
Other attributes such as knowledge, both explicit and tacit, were considered crucial to formulate an effective responses, but significantly, without the intelligence to assimilate different perspectives or the cognitive ability to rapidly process and analyse information, it would be limited ‘’Individuals must have a sharp intelligent mind that is able to get the point quickly and generate appropriate or clever responses without being afraid to do so’’. Intelligence was also considered a factor in prioritising the value of information and remaining situationally aware, but it was also central in a key ability to cleverly apply behavioural and emotional self-restraint appropriate to the situation and the people involved in it. This latter point was seen as particularly important as few decision makers ever felt totally calm in a crisis, yet had learned from experience, training, feedback and self development to maintain composure by regulating emotions, astutely aware that it gave others an impression of unruffled control and the reassurance necessary to alleviate stress. Although the general theme of Emotional Intelligence was universal many considered it an ability that grew with maturity and after experiences had fostered a little humility, self-assurance and confidence. It was also recognised that the relationship between Emotional Intelligence and a fierce determination to overcome the challenge can’t be conflicting and an individual must have the intelligence and courage to gauge when empathy stops and hard core decisions are taken.
However a constant threat to emotional stability and effective decisions was escalating pressure, stress and anxiety. Many considered that the right amount could give clarity of thought ‘’because of the sense of urgency to do something rather than nothing, it’s a tool that can be used very effectively’’. Some felt that a person with the mind-set that relished the impetus stress evoked to forming new ideas and problem-solving was more likely to engage the challenge under less stress, more determination and zeal. However as ambiguity increased, levels of stress and anxiety went far beyond those that only stimulate, instead they could compounded or extenuated certain existing characteristics and behaviours for the worse or better. In these circumstances innate characteristics that helped to cope, reduce or relieve stress were seen as critical. Some saw humour (often dark), self-deprecating banter or wit as having a profound effect on lifting morale and perpetuating a defiant attitude and a high level of intelligence could help contextualise the situation and maintain clarity. Combined with a confidence and self assurance it could give certainty to one’s own decision, and an openness to listen and evaluate others advise. But beyond this, the character and experience to take decisions based on marginal probability of success was seen as a freedom of thought that perpetuated a reduction in personal stress. Broader characteristics were those of being able to develop camaraderie and trust through shared experiences, that produced a shared mental model allowing pressure to be absorbed by the group rather than the individual.
However, as covered in the academic perspective, stress can also trigger cognitive biases and a myriad of other possible behavioural consequences that have a direct impact on how decisions are made, appreciating this is critical. So given that failure to pass important information, misinterpretation, wrong prioritisation, use of ambiguous terminology and lack of courage, are typical behaviours induced under stress, what seems lacking is an awareness of the signs of how and why normal behaviours deteriorate and the effects of cognitive biases. At a basic level practitioners should be ‘’aware of being aware’’ of cognitive biases and stress related behavioural change, with purposeful training to ‘think about thinking’. Other methods like peer review, advice or line manager feedback, organisational history and crises literature were all considered useful sources to obtain perspective and begin self-analysis. But it appears that, in most training, developing the essential behavioural skills needed to counter cognitive bias and reduce stress are neglected in favour of over emphasising the use of Contingency Plans, and SOPs and restricting freedom of thought at the very moment it is needed most.
Conclusion
The collation of related theoretical and practitioner considerations demonstrates the complexities of human behaviour and thus exemplifies why the ‘Human Factor’ is so often the cause or contributor of failure in crises and why every effort should be given to identifying the components of an effective crisis decision maker.
The perceived difficulty is that every individual is unique, operating within their own schism and ‘Map of the World’ created from a blend of genetics, upbringing, background, education and experience with the capability to adapt behavioural responses to changing environments. The range of possible human variables responding to the equally unique crises may seem unlimited but there appear some common components subscribed to by both practitioners and academics that may allow the individual to be better recognised.
It seems likely that the way an individual behaves is largely based on the stable traits that they inherit and values they form at an early age, although behaviours may adapt and develop with experience over time, they remain stable variables and therefore identifiable and predictable. However emotional and self-control of their use, understanding how and why they manifest themselves , to what measure and effect is vital. But it is how they are put to good effect that may be dependent on how strong and self aware an individual is to self-regulate, moderate and monitor their effect. These strengths appear strongly linked to a learned or inherent proportional use of Emotional Intelligence, intelligence and confidence.
The association between lower dimension facets to the Big Five Personality Traits shows commonly acknowledged aspects of effective behaviour and strong indicators towards specific types of character traits. That these should be predominantly; Extroversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, Emotional Stability and Conscientiousness is perhaps not that surprising. However less obvious are the discrete facets that indicate a very slight leaning towards their opposites, for example; Introversion, Neuroticism and Disagreeableness. These took the form, in words, like; careful, nosy and dominant and from interview like ; maverick, unorthodox and ruthless. It implies individuals should have the wherewithal, capability and confidence to use such behaviours when required. This observation seems crucial to understanding the blended behaviour, emotional maturity and experience needed to apply them effectively, appropriately and proportionally.
The greatest threat to the process of decision making is most likely the affects of stress on behaviour and cognitive abilities and the consequent susceptibility to cognitive biases. It is therefore surprising, at the least, that practitioners showed a lack of awareness and understanding about what they were and their potential impact. To be unaware of the power of such biases on judgement, is to restrict being able to mitigate against them. There needs to be a culture of awareness in organisations and crisis management training companies need to more fully educate personnel about, their effects and impact. The mindset to make time to think about the effects of pressure on cognitive processes of judgement and reasoning is an important first step.
Stress can affect an individual both mentally and physically and is a silent, invasive, escalatory and self perpetuating condition. It can provoke extraordinary creative ideas and courageous action but also extreme denial, inaction and despair. Possessing credentials that reduce the adverse effects while maintaining the impetus for positive decisions is vital and evidence suggests certain behaviours can help mitigate against stress, however they may run counter to many accepted norms. An organisation that plays ‘safe’ in the selection of individuals may inadvertently be in the first stages of a crisis.
